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Abstract
We introduce a model of endogenous growth in which the returns to
innovation are determined by the technology adoption decisions of the
users of the new innovative technologies. The technology adoption de-
cisions in our model consist of two dimensions. The ﬁrst is when to
adopt a new technology. The second is at what initial productivity
level to adopt it and which part of its productivity potential to learn
by doing. Our model economy is one with realistic adoption curves
for each technology, the shape of which are an important determinant
of the return to innovations and thus of economic growth.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In recent years, the theoretical literature on economic growth and technolog-
ical progress has basically struggled with two main questions.
The ﬁrst is: “What mechanisms and incentives move the world technology
f r o n t i e r ? ” . T h i sq u e s t i o ni sa tt h eh e art of the literature on endogenous
growth.
The second question is: “Why do not all countries use the most advanced
technologies that they have access to?”.
The two leading answers to this question that have emerged from the
literature are (i) that institutional barriers in many countries prevent users
from adopting the best practice technologies, as in Parente and Prescott
(1994), and (ii) that the new and best practice technologies are developed
to complement a skill set that is available in less-developed countries and
are thus not appropriate for them to use, as in Basu and Weil (1998) and
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (????).
Even though thinking about these two main questions separately is in-
teresting in itself, the answers to them are inherently intertwined. That is,
the speed with which technologies are adopted and implemented aﬀects the
proﬁts made using them which in turn ﬁnance the research and development
needed to invent them.
In this paper, we introduce a model that considers both endogenous inven-
tion and adoption of technologies. We use this model to show how incentives
to adopt technologies aﬀect the return to the introduction of such technolo-
gies and thus the amount of R&D done in an economy which determines the
pace of economic growth.
What emerges from our joint consideration of incentives to invent and
a d o p ti st h a tw h a tu s e dt ol o o kl i k eb a r r i e r st or i c h e si nt h ec o n t e x to fP a r e n t e
and Prescott (1994) are also barriers to invention. This signiﬁcantly changes
the welfare impact of policies that move countries closer to the technological
frontier and speed up their adoption of technologies. Such policies do not
only have the potential to substantially increase the standard of living of
the current generation they also aﬀect the pace of technological change and
therefore have an incrementally important eﬀect going forward.
The structure of our paper is as follows. In the next section we introduce
the four sectors of economic activity that make up our model economy. In
Section 3, we solve for the equilibrium path of this economy and derive the
dynamic system that describes this path. In Section 4, we calibrate our
2model and illustrate and quantify the importance of the rate of technology
adoption for the incentives to innovate and the rate of growth.
2T h e m o d e l
The model economy that we consider consists of four sectors. The ﬁrst is
the household sector. The second is the ﬁnal goods sector. The third is
the intermediate goods sector, while the ﬁnal sector is the R&D sector that
innovates.
In this section, we introduce each of these sectors separately. We consider
the equilibrium outcome when they interact in the next section.
2.1 Household sector
The representative household in our model economy is endowed with one
unit of time each period and supplies this unit of time of labor inelastically.
It aims to maximize the present discounted value of the ﬂow of its utility.










where ct is ﬁnal goods consumption.
It does so subject to the following ﬂow budget constraint
˙ at = rtat + wt + πt − ct (2)
Here at denotes the assetholdings of the household in terms of the ﬁnal good,
rt is the real interest rate, wt is the real wage rate that is paid to the household
in compensation for its supply of its one unit of labor, and πt are the proﬁts
the are redistributed from ﬁrms to the households.
The resulting optimal consumption Euler equation is of the form
˙ ct
ct
= σ(rt − β)( 3 )
As Caselli and Ventura (2000) have shown, because the growth rate of con-
sumption for a household is the same independent of its level of wealth,
the distribution of proﬁts among households does not matter for aggregate
household behavior. Therefore, we will ignore distributional eﬀects in the
3rest of this paper and assume that all households receive the same dividend
payments, πt.
2.2 Final goods sector
The ﬁnal goods that are consumed by the households are produced using a set
of intermediate goods combined using a CES technology. Let yt denote ﬁnal
goods output at time t and yvt be the inputs of intermediate good of vintage
v at time t. The range of intermediate goods used in production increases
over time. This increase is the major source of technological progress in this
economy. In this sense, the model here is a model of increasing varieties and
quality ladders in the tradition of Romer (1990)1. The production function








where 0 < θ < 1( 4 )
Here vt is the newest vintage of intermediates used in production. We will
be more speciﬁc about what we mean by ‘newest’ in the next section when
we introduce the intermediate goods producing sector. This newest vintage
will be endogenously determined in our model in the sense that an increase
in vt reﬂects the adoption of new technologies at time t.
The market for ﬁnal goods is assumed to be perfectly competitive, such
that its factor allocation can be represented as resulting as that of a sin-
gle ﬁrm choosing its factor demands to equate marginal products to their
corresponding factor prices.
These factor prices are given by the prices of the intermediate goods,
which are given by pv,t. We normalize the price of the ﬁnal good to unity by
using it as the numeraire good throughout our analysis.
Given these prices, the intermediate goods demand for goods of vintage








1In principle, one can add a scrappage margin such that intermediate goods that are
not productivity enough are not used in production anymore. This would add a creative
destruction element to the model. This margin would dramatically complicate the math
and not add a lot to the main intuition, though.
4which reﬂects the demand curve faced by the producers of the intermediate
goods.
2.3 Intermediate goods producers
The intermediate goods producers are at the heart of our economy. They
are the ones that make the technology adoption decisions that determine the
return to innovations invented in the R&D sector that we consider in the
next subsection.
Each type of intermediate good is provided by a single supplier. Because
of the fact that these goods are only imperfect substitutes in ﬁnal goods pro-
duction, the suppliers of these goods compete monopolistically. The decisions
of these intermediate goods suppliers can be divided into two parts.
The ﬁrst set of decisions pertains to the price set as well as the factor
demand choices. The second set of choices has to do with the choice of
adoption of the intermediate goods producing technology, i.e. the entry in
the market, as well as with the implementation of this technology and the
path of its productivity level.
I nt h i ss e c t i o nw ew i l ls o l v ef o rt h e s et w op a r t so ft h ei n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d s
producer’s problem sequentially. We will ﬁrst solve for its optimal factor
demands and price setting choice as a function of the paths of its own pro-
ductivity level, factor prices, and ﬁnal goods demand. Subsequently, we will
then introduce and solve the optimal technology adoption and implementa-
tion choice that the intermediate goods producers make.
2.3.1 Factor demands and price setting
Intermediate goods are produced using capital and labor that are combined





vt where 0 < α < 1( 6 )
Labor is assumed to be homogenous and each intermediate goods producer
hires workers at the competitive real wage rate wt.
What makes the producer of a particular intermediate goods vintage spe-
cial in this economy is that it is the sole ﬁrm that has access to the production
technology of the vintage. This production technology is embodied in the
type of capital that the ﬁrm uses.
5Each intermediate goods producer has the sole knowledge on how to con-
vert a unit of the ﬁnal good into a unit of the vintage speciﬁc capital good kvt.
This process is reversible. It can then use the available vintage speciﬁcc a p -
ital stock, kvt, to produce intermediate goods at the embodied productivity
level zvt.
C a p i t a lg o o d su s e di np r o d u c t i o na r ea s s u m e dt od e p r e c i a t ea tac o n -
stant rate δ. This implies that the capital stock used in the production of
intermediate good of vintage v follows the perpetual inventory rule of the
form
˙ kvt = ivt − δkvt (7)
where ivt is the level of gross investment by supplier v at time t and δ reﬂects
the physical depreciation rate, which we will assume to be constant across
vintages.
In each period, the ﬂow proﬁts of the intermediate goods producer of
vintage v, denoted by πvt,a r eg i v e nb yt h ed i ﬀerence between its revenue
and its factor costs. That is
πvt = pvtyvt − wtlvt − ivt (8)
At time t, given its level of capital, kvt, and the paths of the factor prices,
wt and rt,i t sp r o d u c t i v i t yl e v e l ,zvt,a sw e l la sﬁnal goods demand, yt,t h e
ﬁrm chooses its path of gross investment ivt, its labor input, lvt, its output
level, yvt,a n di t sp r i c epvt to maximize the present discounted value of its








It does so subject to the deﬁnition of ﬂow proﬁts, (8), the vintage produc-
tion function, (6), the capital accumulation equation, (7), and the demand
function, (5).
This dynamic proﬁt maximization problem yields that the ﬁrm will set
its price equal to its marginal cost times a constant factor that represents its



















6Here, uct = rt + δ reﬂects the real user cost of capital.
The resulting factor demands of the ﬁrm satisfy









The resulting level of ﬂow proﬁts in each period is given by
πvt =( 1− θ)pvtyvt (14)
Such that the resulting value of the ﬁrm equals







which will simplify after we aggregate all ﬁrms in the intermediate and ﬁnal
goods sector.
As we show in the mathematical appendix, the ﬁrms’ decisions in the
ﬁnal and intermediate goods sector allow us to use an aggregate production














Furthermore, the aggregate level of total factor productivity, is given by












Furthermore, the shares of output and inputs of the individual ﬁrms in the



























7The aggregate factor demands turn out to satisfy the same optimality
conditions as the factor demands of the individual ﬁrms in the sense that









This aggregate production function representation now allows us to rewrite
the value of the ﬁrm as












which is only a function of the path of the ﬁrm’s productivity level zvs,a sw e l l
as that of aggregate productivity, the real interest rate, and output levels.
2.3.2 Technology adoption and implementation
The technology adoption and implementation decisions that an intermediate
goods producer makes determine the time the intermediate goods vintage
is brought online and at which productivity level it is initially implemented
respectively. In this section we will introduce the costs and beneﬁts related
to these two decisions and solve for the implied optimal choices.
In order to do so, we ﬁrst have to describe the path of productivity after
the adoption and implementation of the technology. This is what we will do
in the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h i ss u b s e c t i o n .I nt h es e c o n dp a r tw et h e nc o n s i d e rw h a t
determines the optimal choices for these decisions.
Learning by doing Suppose that the ﬁrm uses its technology at produc-
tivity level zvt at time t. W ew i l la s s u m et h a ti tg e t sm o r ep r o d u c t i v et h e
longer it uses the technology. That is, we will assume that intermediate
goods ﬁrms learn-by-doing. The speciﬁc functional form that we use for the
learning-by-doing mechanism is similar to the one used by Parente (1994)
and Basu and Weil (1998).
We will assume that, ultimately, the productivity of each technology vin-
tage converges to a maximum feasible level, zv. Denote the normalized rela-




8then we assume that zvs converges to zv according to
˙ xvt = λ(1 − xvt)( 2 4 )
















vt for s>t (25)
and thus, the whole future path of vintage speciﬁc productivity zvs is deter-
mined by its current level zvt. Hence, the choice of productivity at the time
the technology is adopted determines the future path of productivity for the
rest of the lifetime of the intermediate goods vintage.
Given this path of productivity, the value of the ﬁrm can be written solely
as a function of its current productivity level and the paths of aggregate
productivity, the real interest rate, and output. That is, the value function
simpliﬁes to


































where the relative distance to the frontier, xvt, is the only decision variable
that the ﬁrm has control over. Note that, given the other variables, the value
function is linear in xvt.
Adoption and implementation Technologies are licensed to the inter-
mediate goods producers. They pay a licensing fee that allows them to use
the technology vintage inﬁnitely long into the future. This licensing fee de-
pends on the level of advancement, i.e. zv, of the technology that they adopt.
The licensing fee is not the only thing that the ﬁrms have to pay to start
using the technology, though. Before starting to use a technology, a ﬁrm
ﬁrst has to implement it. This implementation requires the use of the ﬁnal
good as an input. We will assume that there are increasing marginal costs
to implementing a more advanced technology and that technologies that are
just invented require an inﬁnite implementation cost.
Formally, a ﬁrm that adopts a new technology at time t has to make two
decisions. The ﬁrst is which technology to adopt, i.e. the choice of vintage
v. The second is at which productivity level to implement it, i.e. the choice
of the relative productivity level xvt.
9We will assume that each of these two decisions are associated with their

















t represents the maximum feasible productivity level of the best tech-
nology invented at time t,w h i l ecat is the time varying adoption cost pa-
rameter. This functional form is just a conjecture. We will show that it
is consistent with equilibrium in R&D sector that we consider in the next
section.















where ci is the implementation cost parameter.
The problem of the entrant can be solved sequentially. In the ﬁrst step we
s o l v ef o rt h eo p t i m a ll e v e lo ft e c h n o l o gy implementation conditional on the
technology vintage, v, being implemented. In the second step, we solve for
the free entry condition, which implies that all technologies are implemented
up till the one for which the new entrants make zero proﬁts in the sense that
the implementation and adoption costs exhaust the value of the ﬁrm, derived
in (26).
The optimal implementation decision of a ﬁrm that adopts technology








t (zvt)( 3 0 )
As we show in Appendix A, the solution to this choice is the root of a

































4 Adoption and growth
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12A Mathematical details
Derivation of equations (10) through (15):







Where the current value Hamiltonian, Hvt,i sg i v e nb y















The ﬁrst order necessary conditions implied by this objective function are
w.r.t. πvt :1 = −µπt (34)
w.r.t yvt : µyt = pvtµπt − µdt (35)




w.r.t. ivt : µπt = −µkt (37)
w.r.t. kvt : − αµyt
yvt
kvt
− µktδ = rtµkt − ˙ µkt (38)






Condition (39) implies that
µdt =( 1− θ)pvt (40)
Combining this with (34) and (35) yields that
µyt = −θpvt (41)
When we substitute this into the optimal labor demand conditions, (36), we ﬁnd
wtlvt = θ(1 − α)pvtyvt (42)
The optimal investment condition which equates the marginal cost of a unit of proﬁts with
the marginal value of an additional unit of capital, i.e. (37), yields that
µkt = 1 (43)




= rt + δ = uct (44)


















13The price level, pvt, that equates the capital labor ratio for the optimal capital and labor





where mcvt is the marginal production cost of vintage v producer and equals the unit















mcvt =( 1− θ)pvtyvt (47)
















which corresponds to (15).
Derivation of equations (16) through (21):
Derivation of equation (31):
First of all, in order to see why the maximization problem (30) actually boils down to






























Secondly, it is worthwhile to rewrite the expression for the value function, i.e. (26) as













































































14then we can write the objective that maximized in the ﬁrms implementation decision as


























































The resulting necessary, and in this case suﬃcient, ﬁrst order condition for the optimal


















which is equation (31) in the main text.
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